66_a_lockdown
But then I know everyone probably has a justification for their lockdown breaches so I have had a bit of a pang of guilt.
( (IP-MAT (ILYR (ILYR (CONJ;_cl_ But;{but})
(ADVP-NIM (ADV then;{then}))
(NP-SBJ;{PERSON_F} (PRO I;{I}))
(VBP;_Tf_ know;{know})
(CP-THT-OB1 (IP-SUB (NP-SBJ;{PERSONS} (Q;_nphd_ everyone;{everyone}))
(ADVP-NIM (ADV probably;{probably}))
(HVP;_Tn_ has;{have})
(NP-OB1 (D a;{a})
(N justification;{justification})
(PP (P-ROLE for;{for})
(NP (NP-GEN;{PERSONS} (PRO;_genm_ their;{their}))
(N lockdown;{lockdown})
(NS breaches;{breach})))))))
(CONJP (ILYR (ADVP-NIM (ADV so;{so}))
(NP-SBJ;{PERSON_F} (PRO I;{I}))
(HVP;_cat_Ve_ have;{have})
(IP-PPL-CAT (HVN;_Tn_ had;{have})
(NP-OB1 (D;_nphd_ a_bit;{a_bit})
(PP (P-ROLE of;{of})
(NP (D a;{a})
(N pang;{pang})
(PP (P-ROLE of;{of})
(NP (N guilt;{guilt}))))))))))
(PUNC .))
(ID 66_a_lockdown;speaker=f))
arc(r_0066_0004__know,r_0066_0002__then,nim).
arc(r_0066_0004__know,r_0066_0003__I,arg0).
arc(r_0066_0004__know,r_0066_0005__everyone__quant,arg1).
arc(r_0066_0005__everyone__quant,r_0066_0007__has,scope).
arc(r_0066_0005__everyone__quant,z_0066_5006,restriction).
arc(r_0066_0007__has,r_0066_0006__probably,nim).
arc(r_0066_0007__has,r_0066_0008__a_r_0066_0009__justification,arg1).
arc(r_0066_0007__has,z_0066_5006,arg0).
arc(r_0066_0008__a_r_0066_0009__justification,r_0066_0012__lockdown_r_0066_0013__breaches,r_0066_0010__for).
arc(r_0066_0012__lockdown_r_0066_0013__breaches,z_0066_5006,gen).
arc(r_0066_0016__have,r_0066_0014__so,nim).
arc(r_0066_0016__have,r_0066_0017__had,scope).
arc(r_0066_0017__had,r_0066_0003__I,arg0).
arc(r_0066_0017__had,r_0066_0018__a_bit,arg1).
arc(r_0066_0018__a_bit,r_0066_0020__a_r_0066_0021__pang,r_0066_0019__of).
arc(r_0066_0020__a_r_0066_0021__pang,r_0066_0023__guilt,r_0066_0022__of).
arc(z_0066_5001,r_0066_0004__know,conj1).
arc(z_0066_5001,r_0066_0016__have,conj2).
fof(formula,axiom,
? [R_0066_0002__THEN,R_0066_0003__I,R_0066_0004__KNOW,R_0066_0014__SO,R_0066_0023__GUILT,R_0066_0020__A_R_0066_0021__PANG,R_0066_0018__A_BIT,R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD,Z_0066_5001] :
( r_0066_0002__then(R_0066_0002__THEN)
& r_0066_0003__I(R_0066_0003__I)
& r_0066_0014__so(R_0066_0014__SO)
& r_0066_0023__guilt(R_0066_0023__GUILT)
& z_0066_5001(Z_0066_5001)
& has_conj2(Z_0066_5001,R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD)
& r_0066_0016__have_r_0066_0017__had(R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD)
& has_arg1(R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD,R_0066_0018__A_BIT)
& r_0066_0018__a_bit(R_0066_0018__A_BIT)
& has_r_0066_0019__of(R_0066_0018__A_BIT,R_0066_0020__A_R_0066_0021__PANG)
& r_0066_0020__a_r_0066_0021__pang(R_0066_0020__A_R_0066_0021__PANG)
& has_r_0066_0022__of(R_0066_0020__A_R_0066_0021__PANG,R_0066_0023__GUILT)
& has_arg0(R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD,R_0066_0003__I)
& has_nim(R_0066_0016__HAVE_R_0066_0017__HAD,R_0066_0014__SO)
& has_conj1(Z_0066_5001,R_0066_0004__KNOW)
& r_0066_0004__know(R_0066_0004__KNOW)
& ! [Z_0066_5006] :
( z_0066_5006(Z_0066_5006)
=> ? [R_0066_0006__PROBABLY,R_0066_0012__LOCKDOWN_R_0066_0013__BREACHES,R_0066_0008__A_R_0066_0009__JUSTIFICATION,R_0066_0007__HAS] :
( r_0066_0006__probably(R_0066_0006__PROBABLY)
& r_0066_0007__has(R_0066_0007__HAS)
& has_arg0(R_0066_0007__HAS,Z_0066_5006)
& has_arg1(R_0066_0007__HAS,R_0066_0008__A_R_0066_0009__JUSTIFICATION)
& r_0066_0008__a_r_0066_0009__justification(R_0066_0008__A_R_0066_0009__JUSTIFICATION)
& has_r_0066_0010__for(R_0066_0008__A_R_0066_0009__JUSTIFICATION,R_0066_0012__LOCKDOWN_R_0066_0013__BREACHES)
& r_0066_0012__lockdown_r_0066_0013__breaches(R_0066_0012__LOCKDOWN_R_0066_0013__BREACHES)
& has_gen(R_0066_0012__LOCKDOWN_R_0066_0013__BREACHES,Z_0066_5006)
& has_nim(R_0066_0007__HAS,R_0066_0006__PROBABLY) ) )
& has_arg0(R_0066_0004__KNOW,R_0066_0003__I)
& has_nim(R_0066_0004__KNOW,R_0066_0002__THEN) ) ).